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Abstract 
 
Purpose  
This paper explores a contemporary European development in research into first 
person accounts of experience, called psychophenomenology (Vermersch 2004), that 
offers enhancements to phenomenological interviewing. It is a form of guided 
introspection that seeks to develop finely-grained first-person accounts by using 
distinctions in language, internal sensory representations and imagery that have been 
incorporated from neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) (Bandler & Grinder 1975a). It 
is also a participative, relational and developmental form of interviewing, in the sense 
that the interviewee can gain significant insight into their experience; the process is 
not concerned purely with data gathering. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
We review the theoretical assumptions on which psychophenomenology is based, 
then describe the principal method used in psychophenomenology, the `explicitation 
interview’. The interview protocol is illustrated with transcript data, through which 
we identify specific aspects of NLP that have been incorporated into 
psychophenomenology.   
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Findings  
Psychophenomenology offers refinements to the precision of phenomenological 
methods found in organizational research, such as interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) (Smith 2008).  
 
Research limitations/implications  
We review the epistemological claims and implications of psychophenomenology. 
 
Practical implications  
These developments may provide a basis for reconsidering the research value of 
introspection, which has often been dismissed as non-rigorous.   
 
Originality/value (mandatory).  
The paper introduces psychophenomenology to the field of organizational research. It 
also describes how psychophenomenology has innovated by drawing from neuro-
linguistic programming (NLP) (Bandler & Grinder 1975a), an approach to personal 
development that is found in organizational practices such as executive coaching, in 
order to enhance the precision and rigour of both interviews and transcript analysis. 
 
Keywords: Psychophenomenology; neuro-linguistic programming; interviewing; 
introspection; emergence; epoche. 
 
Classification: Research paper  
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Phenomenology in organizational research 
 
According to a review of interviewing methods in organizational research, `the 
interview remains the most common method of data gathering in qualitative research’, 
and `the goal of any qualitative research interview is… to see the research topic from 
the perspective of the interviewee’ (King 2004:11). King acknowledges three main 
epistemological stances in qualitative methodologies; realist, phenomenological and 
social constructionist. This paper is concerned with phenomenological interviewing. 
 
Phenomenology is an established approach in qualitative research (Giorgi 1985, 
Moustakas 1994) that `is directed at gaining an in-depth understanding of the nature 
and meaning of everyday experience’ (Gibson & Hanes 2003:182). Gibson and Hanes 
emphasise the contribution that phenomenology has to make to research and practice 
in human resource development (HRD); Conklin (2007) makes a similar case for 
management inquiry, and Kupers (2008) advocates a phenomenological approach to 
the analysis of organizational learning. Contemporary examples of phenomenology in 
organizational research include Gallagher et al. (2007) and Heil (2008); further 
studies are cited by Gibson and Haines (2003). There is interest in varieties of 
phenomenology including interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Smith 
2008), which has arisen mainly in health studies and is now being applied in 
organizational contexts (e.g. Cropley & Millward 2009); and relational 
phenomenology (Finlay 2002).  
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Despite a long tradition of phenomenological research, Gibson and Hanes 
acknowledge (2003:193) that it has no prescribed method. Giorgi (1985:25) ascribes 
the lack of a clear methodology for such research to the notion that phenomenology 
itself is an emergent knowledge system: ‘Neither psychological phenomenology nor 
psychology as a human science is as yet a well-founded, fully mature discipline; both 
are only in the process of coming into being’.  
 
Phenomenology usually relies on first person accounts for its data, yet such 
information, especially when arrived at through introspection, tends to be mistrusted. 
According to Depraz et al  (2003:7),  most scientific psychology has spent a century 
disqualifying and ignoring first person accounts.  Stevens (2000:112) believes that the 
development of appropriate procedures and instruments for the investigation of first 
person experience is still in its infancy. Lutz and Thompson (2003:31) point out that, 
`the integration of such first person data into the experimental protocols of cognitive 
neuroscience still faces a number of epistemological and methodological challenges’. 
Depraz (1999:108-9), observing that since Husserl’s time there has been much 
theorising in the field, believes that the time is right to return to developing more 
practical approaches to phenomenological investigations. According to Velmans, `a 
psychology that investigates brain states and behaviour, but not how humans 
experience the world, cannot be complete’ (2000:340). Vermersch (1999), who builds 
on Husserl’s phenomenology, believes that there is a scientific vacuum surrounding 
the use of first person data, and that ignoring the potential of information arrived at 
through introspection leads to an impoverished view of consciousness. He argues that 
introspection is necessary for the development of psychology, and has been too long 
ignored. 
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In response to this need, a strong case has been made for the role of first person 
accounts as valuable data in the field of consciousness studies. There, 
psychophenomenology has emerged as an approach to researching first-person 
accounts through what Vermersch (2004) has called guided introspection. What 
characterises psychophenomenology is its focus on the subtleties of language in 
people’s reports of their experience, and associated features of people’s `inner 
landscapes’, such as sensory representations and imagery. Knowledge of these 
subtleties enhances the capacity for `bracketing’ (Jeanne 2003), since the researcher 
can distinguish more finely between their own constructs and those of the 
interviewee. It also highlights the risk that existing phenomenological methods may 
be gaining imprecise accounts, or inappropriately interpreting accounts through the 
researcher’s constructs and presuppositions despite their conscious intent to do 
otherwise.  
 
Despite an extensive literature on research interviewing, there is little evidence of 
sophistication in the awareness and use of language. For example, Kvale’s text on 
interviewing offers only a rudimentary categorisation of questions (Kvale 1996:133-
5). Qualitative interviews inevitably utilise language, yet the role and significance of 
language in gathering phenomenological accounts seems to be a metaphorical 
elephant in the room that no one talks about.  
 
We emphasise that psychophenomenology is wholly consistent with the commitment 
in phenomenology to discovering interviewees’ meanings and respecting their views 
of the world. The argument made by psychophenomenology is that it is knowledge of 
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the forms and structures of language, not its contents, that enables the researcher to 
develop a more precise, extensive and rigorous understanding of the interviewee’s 
subjective world.  
 
Psychophenomenology 
Psychophenomenology was developed as a response to a perceived need for a more 
methodical approach to introspection and eliciting personal accounts. Vermersch 
conceives of psychophenomenology as both a research tool and an approach to 
discovery. Many of its findings are published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 
(e.g. Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999), and in a French journal, Expliciteri, dedicated to 
communicating developments in the field. 
 
Its developer, Pierre Vermersch (Vermersch 1999),  worked closely with Francisco 
Varela in Paris, and was influenced by his theory of `embodied mind’ (Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch 1993). Varela et al (1993) criticised contemporary cognitivism, 
arguing that the time was ripe for cognitive science to go beyond the dominance of 
the computational metaphor and enlarge its horizons to investigate the broader 
phenomenon of actual lived human experience, and the role of reflection and 
introspection as empirical tools for gathering information about conscious processesii. 
Hence the idea of embodiment is central to psychophenomenology, where it is 
conceived of as encompassing both the lived embodied experiential structure, and the 
context or milieu in which cognitive mechanisms operate.  
 
Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) stress a number of conceptual and theoretical 
starting points for  researchers in consciousness studies. These form the basis of a 
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praxis that involves a number of epistemological distinctions, which we summarise as 
follows: 
 
 experience from accounts of experience;  
 procedural knowledge from declarative knowledge;  
 verbal from pre-verbal information;  
 content from process;  
 description from explanation;  
 internal from external attention.  
 
What distinguishes psychophenomenology from its Husserlian roots is that it focuses 
directly on practical ways of investigating experience through the act of reflection.  It 
admits to being a methodology that is still emerging, discovering the pitfalls of 
investigating subjective experience, and endeavouring to define its field (Varela & 
Shear 1999, Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003).  
 
A central aim of psychophenomenology is to elicit information about conscious 
experience at increased levels of `granularity’ (Vermersch 1994) in factual 
descriptions. It aims to access more details of the complex dynamics of awareness 
(and assumes that this is possible), and to bring these into consciousness. Granularity 
refers to making distinctions at ever finer levels, and for the researcher to be able to 
recognise at what level of specificity, or what kinds of processes are being researched. 
With the explicitation interview, Vermersch seeks to ‘map’ conscious experience at 
increasingly higher magnification. In his words: 
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`Describing an act’s structure requires that one describes its temporal unfolding at 
different levels of density: the linkage between subordinate goals, the succession of 
stages and at the heart of each stage, elementary actions seen as both acts to be 
accomplished and as information-gathering acts, then micro-operations etc.’  
 
(Vermersch 1999:31)  
  
Psychophenomenology is predominantly inductive. It aims to uncover phenomena, 
then draw conclusions rather than to apply pre-existing theory deductively. Depraz et 
al (2003:17) describe psychophenomenologists as pragmatists, who care about `how 
well something adapts to its situation rather than how well one formulates a priori 
principles … in praxis, conduct finds its truth in itself and does not need a prepared 
blueprint’. Researchers are urged to be ‘perpetual beginners’, and phenomena are 
considered to reveal themselves, rather than being actively sought. The emphasis is on 
finding out for oneself, rather than being led by existing theory. 
 
The explicitation interview 
 
The explicitation interview (`L'Entretien d'Explicitation', Vermersch 1994) is of 
central importance to psychophenomenology. Much of Vermersch’s writings (which 
are in French, translated for the purposes of this article by Mathison) attempt to 
describe, with precision and rigour, the skills and procedures needed to guide a 
person’s introspective journey; a detailed description of the explicitation interview is 
given by Petitmengin (2006). 
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The aim of this protocol is to elicit increasingly precise detailed information about 
people’s inner landscapes, such as when they are memorising, introspecting, or 
becoming aware of how they learn. Petitmengin, for instance, has tracked the 
unfolding of the intuitive experience in an attempt to discover a common pattern to 
the phenomenon (Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999)iii. Mathison (2003) used a similar 
approach to elicit people’s responses to small changes (experienced by the listener at 
the sensory level) in the syntax of a statement. More recently, Petimengin has used the 
explicitation interview to enable sufferers of epileptic seizures to become aware of 
very small changes in their awareness which herald an attack, but of which they had 
so far been unconscious (Petitmengin, Baulac, & Navarro 2006). 
 
In order to achieve this precise and detailed exploration of inner landscapes, 
psychophenomenology has drawn from the tools and frameworks available in the 
practice known as NLP, which we now introduceiv. We then go on to identify and 
illustrate (with extracts from transcripts) the ways in which NLP has been 
incorporated into psychophenomenology.  
 
Neuro-Linguistic Programming  
 
NLP may seem an unusual source of a potential contribution to phenomenological 
methods, since it is a controversial practice (Tosey & Mathison 2009); there is no 
little irony in the fact that it has come to inform an academic research methodology. 
This migration of frameworks from organizational practice into research methodology 
represents an interesting transfer of knowledge. It is important to emphasise that its 
validity in psychophenomenology does not rely upon any claim to efficacy as a 
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psychotherapeutic procedure, which is contested (Heap 1988).  It is also relevant to 
note that NLP appears to be less controversial in non-English speaking cultures, 
including France, where psychophenomenology developed, Belgium (Esser 2004) and 
Germany (Walker 1996).  
 
Developed in the 1970s by Richard Bandler and John Grinder as a pragmatic 
approach to communication, initially for psychotherapists (Bandler & Grinder 1975a), 
NLP proposes ways in which syntactical structures may directly influence meaning 
making, based on a combination of insights from transformational grammar (Grinder 
& Elgin 1973) and empirical observation. Its founders espoused a pragmatism, 
claiming to be interested only in ‘what works’, and sought to remove linguistics from 
the confines of a narrow academic field. From there it has become more a commercial 
product than an academic endeavour. It is used in organizational contexts as a method 
of executive coaching (Linder-Pelz & Hall 2007, Hayes 2006); and its techniques and 
frameworks have a wide variety of applications in business (Knight 2002) and 
management development (Molden 2001).   
 
In fact NLP was described originally as a methodology, which was called `modelling’ 
(Grinder, DeLozier, & Bandler 1977:4). Modelling is intended to make human 
capabilities available for others to learn: `The objective of the NLP modelling process is 
not to end up with the one `right’ or `true’ description of a particular person’s thinking 
process, but rather to make an instrumental map that allows us to apply the strategies 
that we have modeled in some useful way’ (Dilts 1998:30).  
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This methodology was developed through Bandler and Grinder’s study of three well-
known therapists in the early 1970s. Bandler was asked by Robert Spitzer, a psychiatrist 
and publisher, to transcribe the recently deceased Fritz Perls’ recordings of his 
workshops and sessions with patients (Spitzer 1992). He also studied the patterns of 
communication used by the family therapist, Virginia Satir, attending many of her 
workshops as a recording technician, and later working with her personally. Bandler 
became intrigued by the prospect of identifying basic, replicable communication 
patterns of people were who could produce change. John Grinder, then an associate 
professor of linguistics at Kresge College, University of Santa Cruz, joined him in this 
work, using his expertise in transformational grammar to develop their findings. 
Gregory Bateson, who was also teaching at Kresge College (Grant & Riesman 1978), 
acted as their mentor (Bostic St.Clair & Grinder 2001). Many assumptions on which 
NLP is based are claimed by authors in that field (e.g. Dilts & DeLozier 2000) to be 
rooted conceptually in the cybernetics and epistemological explorations of Bateson’s 
thinking (e.g. Bateson 2000). 
 
Bateson urged both Bandler and Grinder to study the communication patterns of the 
Hypnotherapist Milton Erickson (Bostic St.Clair & Grinder 2001). The founders also 
drew heavily from developments at the Palo Alto Mental Research Institute 
(Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson 1967), which gave it a constructivist outlook. This 
work, added to the insights derived from Satir and Perls, led Bandler and Grinder to 
specify ways in which the forms and structures of language can influence people’s 
meaning-making and experience, as described in a stream of early publications 
(Bandler & Grinder 1975a, 1975b; Bandler, Grinder, & Satir 1976; Grinder & 
Bandler 1976; Grinder, DeLozier, & Bandler 1977)v.  
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The principles by which NLP operates have many parallels with cognitive linguistics 
(Evans & Green 2006), the basic premise of which is that grammar has a cognitive 
dimension. In other words, both NLP and cognitive linguistics reject the common-
sense view that language contains or indicates meaning, regarding it instead as 
providing directives or instructions for sense-making. Thus Bandler and Grinder 
concluded that syntactical structures activated certain semantic processes, and, 
crucially, that language has an epistemological dimension; as well as transmitting 
information about content it activates certain epistemological processes used to make 
sense of any message. Both NLP and cognitive linguistics take as a starting point the 
belief that syntactical language patterns reveal and mirror the processes involved in 
conceptualising and sense making (Evans & Green 2006). Fauconnier (1997:40) sums 
up this approach: `The natural-language sentence is a set of (underspecified) 
instructions for cognitive constructions at many different levels.’  
 
The principle that language acts as a cognitive directive is highly important for 
research interviewing, since an understanding of the epistemology of syntactical 
structures can assist researchers in obtaining first person data with a high degree of 
precision. This is the essence of the contribution of NLP to psychophenomenology. 
The development of the explicitation interview was influenced directly by many of 
the insights into language and cognition proposed by the originators of NLP, as shown 
by references to the NLP literature in the bibliographies of publications by Vermersch 
and Petitmengin. Vermersch is a Master Practitioner of NLP (Vermersch 1994: 106 
footnote), and makes extensive use of NLP in the training of guidesvi.  
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How psychophenomenology has drawn from NLP 
Here we illustrate describe and illustrate three central ways in which the explicitation 
interview incorporates NLP: 
 
 Enabling evocation (through association, transderivational search and 
perceptual positions) 
 The meta-model: language patterns.   
 Eliciting sensory detail: internal sensory representations and their sub-
modalities. 
 
Enabling evocation  
  
The first stage of the explicitation process is to guide the interviewee to associate fully 
into the memory or re-enactment (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003) of the event 
being investigated.  
 
This can be likened to, and also contrasted with, the phenomenological practice 
reported by Gibson and Haines (2003:191). Gibson and Haines describe the `primary 
question’ used in a study of mentoring: `Start with your first experience with 
mentoring – and describe that experience – for example, how did the relationship get 
started?’. Among the potential follow-up questions listed is; `How did you know, 
what did you see happening?’ 
 
Psychophenomenology is similarly interested in descriptions of a specific experience. 
However, rather than ask these questions that refer to the experience in the past tense 
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(e.g. `what did you see happening?’), the explicitation interview will seek to enable 
people to re-access or re-live events, and then to describe these as if they are 
happening in the present. Questions will therefore be in the present tense, about what 
the interviewee is experiencing now: thus, `what do you see happening?’. 
 
The following is an extract from an explicitation interview (conducted by the first author), 
the purpose of which was to enable the participant, Edward, to discover more about his 
experience of having `insight’. Rather than exploring the participant’s opinions or beliefs 
about having insights, the explicitation interview works by reaccessing a specific example 
of this experience. The interviewer’s purpose was therefore to enable the participant to 
recall such an experience. 
 
J. …so can you think of a time, or allow a time to emerge in your memory, when 
you had an insight … into whatever it was ? 
 
Here the question deliberately invites the participant to engage in a search to identify 
a specific occasion.  
 
Initially the participant responded with the comment: 
 
Edward. […] I guess my perceptions are coloured in a way by academic 
understanding of what I mean by insight.  I tend to think of it in theoretical and 
conceptual terms. […] When invited to give an example of my own insights it’s a 
little more difficult. Let me think, let me think, let me think. 
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This was followed by a long silence. When Edward finally said: “I’m driving a car,” 
the interviewer knew that the participant was accessing the internal imagery of a 
specific memory. This could then be investigated further by eliciting a more detailed 
description of the stages leading to the insight. 
 
The form of the interviewer’s language encourages the person to direct their attention 
inwards, and is vague enough to allow the subject choice about what specific memory is 
evoked. This exemplifies the NLP notion of `transderivational searching’, a term used by 
Bandler and Grinder ( 1975b:220) to describe the effect that hypnotherapist Milton 
Erickson’s questions had on his patients, where they engaged in an internal search for 
meaning, scanning their own experiences and constructs in order to make sense of another 
person’s communication. Knowing this, researchers can structure a question to elicit a certain 
direction for the respondent’s internal search, and then investigate what emerges at that level 
of experience.  
 
Inviting the participant to see, hear and feel whatever is happening also encourages 
them to re-enact the event in their inner world, as much as possible, as if it were 
happening now. Vermersch refers to this state as being in evocation. In NLP 
terminology, the person has re-associated with the experience. It is even suggested 
that the physiological concomitants of the event may thus be re-experienced, which is 
potentially highly useful for research purposes, as `the reference point for 
understanding perception is no longer a pre-given, independent world but rather the 
sensory-motor structure of the perceiver’ (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1993:173). 
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A further important distinction that is proposed in psychophenomenology, and which 
is mentioned in NLP, is that there are three possible standpoints or perceptual 
positions which complement one another. These are referred to in the literature as 
first, second and third person positions (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:80 et 
seq). Each may bring equally valid information to an inquiry, but cannot stand alone. 
The researcher needs to be aware from which standpoint information originates, and 
when it is appropriate to use information from each of these. Information gleaned 
from one perceptual position alone is considered as incomplete; information that 
confuses first and second perceptual positions is proposed as inadmissible.  
 
First person accounts are those which are only accessible to the person undergoing the 
experience under investigation.  Thus in Petitmengin’s work, her participants’ reports 
on what they discovered when they re-evoked their experience of intuition are 
classified as first person accounts.  
 
The second person account arises from what is described as `an exchange between 
situated individuals’ (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:81). The researcher guiding 
her subject’s introspective journey, whilst listening, observing and de-briefing, 
continuously maintains an awareness of her own responses to the emerging material, 
and differentiates between the two. For instance, the signs that an interviewee’s 
attention is turned inwards and may be engaged in a transderivational search is 
information obtained from the point of view of the second person. The second person 
is perceived as needing to develop an empathic resonance with the first person, a 
metaphorical meeting on common ground. However, the information obtained from 
this viewpoint is of a different ordervii, to that of the first person, and contributes to 
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the validation of the emergent material. Researcher and participant become an 
interacting dyad with different and interdependent roles to play. 
 
The third person stance is an objective perspective, like that of the traditional scientist 
who appears to ‘forge facts as independent world entities’ (Depraz, Varela, & 
Vermersch 2003:80), avoiding the supposed taint of subjectivity in his search for 
universally applicable truths.  However, that traditional perspective is viewed in 
psychophenomenology as too wedded to the reification of the theoretical and the myth 
of objectivity, as it can appear free from any concrete, embodied reference 
experience. In psychophenomenology the third person stance is only valid if it results 
from a collaborative, grounded exploration from first and second person positions. 
 
The meta-model 
 
The second way in which psychophenomenology has drawn from NLP is through a  
typology of syntactical structures, called the `meta-model’ (Bandler & Grinder 
1975a), that indicate patterns in a person’s verbal reports on their `map of the world’, 
and reveal aspects of how it had been constructed (see table 2, which shows the full 
set of original meta-model categories). This typology was based on patterns identified 
in transformational linguistics (Grinder & Elgin 1973), and was claimed to reflect the 
ways in which Satir, Perls and Erickson used language in practice.  
 
The meta-model provides ways of investigating people’s constructs through carefully 
targeted questions that correspond to each pattern or syntactical structure. In its 
application, Bandler and Grinder emphasised Bateson’s view that language belongs to 
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a different domain to that of sensory experience, and that one of the greatest fallacies 
in western thought is to confuse map with territory (Bateson 2000:455). In this, 
Bateson was influenced by Korzybski’s dictum that `the map is not the territory’, 
which has become a central principle of NLP. Hence a researcher who is aware of the 
different levels of abstraction inherent in the language used to report on an experience 
can distinguish information about the actual, sensory representation of an event, from 
the beliefs (interpretations and explanations) that the person may have generated. 
These are epistemologically distinct; a person’s description of, say, their internal 
imagery of an event, is of a different logical type from the abstract categories used to 
explain it.  
 
The meta-model can be applied directly to research in two main ways. It has been 
used as a framework for analysing interview transcripts to track subtle conceptual 
changes (Tosey, Mathison & Michelli 2005). It can also be used to design precise 
questions that engage not with the content of an interviewee’s account, but with its 
syntactical structures.  
 
To illustrate this use of the meta-model interview, here is a short extract from a 
transcript. For example, one syntactical pattern in the NLP meta-model (Bandler & 
Grinder 1975a), is called `modal operators’. These are words that define the mode in 
which an action is to be carried out, such as `will’, `can’, `may’, `might’, `won’t’ and 
so on. In this inquiry, the researcher (Mathison 2003) sought to elicit the subjectively 
experienced distinctions between the modal operators could and will. Initially, 
participants were asked to think about something that they were intending to do, but 
not to specify the activity. They were invited to think about the activity in such a way 
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that they were aware of what they saw, heard and felt as they re-presented the event to 
themselves, and then to report on any changes in the internal representations when 
using the two different modal operators. The extract is from an interview with one of 
these participants, Simon. 
 
J. (…) and if I say ‘You could do it’? 
 
Simon: That’s much gentler. The kinaesthetic is more relaxed, it’s em….    The 
external auditory effect is one of support, so it’s my choice… the internal, the picture 
is soft, still clear, but soft. 
 
Note that the statement ‘the external auditory effect is one of support’ is general. We 
know that Simon is hearing something external to himself (i.e. as distinct from 
internally), and we know that he somehow equates this sound with a construct, 
`support’. By comparison, ‘the picture (of the intended activity) is soft, still clear’, is 
more specific about the qualities of Simon’s awareness. 
 
Eliciting sensory detail 
 
When the participant is fully in evocation, the guide invites them to notice what is 
happening in their interior worlds at the sensory level. What do they now see in their 
interior vision? What sort of qualities do their visual representations have? One of the 
most important tasks the guide has is to ensure that the participant does not return to 
their habitual levels of description, beliefs or viewpoints, but is genuinely engaged in 
exploring the unfamiliar dimensions of their inner landscape.  
© Jane Mathison & Paul Tosey     October 2009, amended January 2010 
 
 
21 
 
There is a fundamental distinction made within NLP between the content of a 
reported event, and the processes generating the syntactic patterns by which the event 
is verbalised. NLP claims to work predominantly with process (Bandler & Grinder 
1979). In psychophenomenology, similarly, Petitmengin stresses that `the content, 
like the context, can be useful to understand what kind of experience it is, but contains 
no information on the subjective living out associated with this experience’ 
(Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999:50). A researcher able to make this distinction therefore 
has the choice of attending to either the content of a verbal report, or of turning to the 
processes that bring it about.  
 
As mentioned, Petitmengin (Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999) used a mixture of 
psychophenomenology and her knowledge of NLP (as indicated in her text and 
bibliography) to explore the act of intuition. She interviewed twenty-four people who 
had claimed to have had significant intuitive experiences, describing her role as 
researcher as helping her subjects to re-live the images, sensations, sounds that are 
associated with that experience. The first part of her empirical inquiry was to track her 
participants’ introspective reports of undergoing the intuitive act purely in terms of 
the sequences of what she terms sensorial modalities - what they saw, heard and felt 
as an intuition emerged into their conscious awareness. From this she derived a 
tentative, generalised model describing some common features of the intuitive 
experience.  She concluded that the intuitive experience first makes itself known at 
the pre-verbal level as synaesthesias, a meld of sights, sounds and feelings, before it is 
verbalised. In this way, Petitmengin claims to have been able to arrive at a more 
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generalised description or model of the actual experience of the emergence of the 
intuitive act.  
 
The following extract gives an example of the kind of questioning used in the 
explicitation interview: 
 
Participant: I feel that it’s time to visualise my interior landscape 
Researcher: How do you know that it’s time? 
Participant: Because I have this sensation of calmness 
Researcher: What is this sensation like? Where do you feel it? 
 
(Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999:48) 
 
Here the researcher recognises that there is another layer of experience subtending the 
participant’s feeling (revealed by the use of the sensory predicate ‘feel’) that it is time 
to visualise her interior landscape. The researcher then seeks to elicit an aspect that 
appears to have been `deleted’ (How do you know it’s time?). 
 
When the participant responds that a ‘sensation of calmness’ is her indicator, the 
questions become even more specific (`where do you feel it?’). Here the researcher 
seeks information about the possible bodily location of the feeling. By asking the 
interviewee to become aware of this layer of consciousness, their attention is drawn to 
the background, or process, rather than the figure, or content, of the experience. The 
aim of the explicitation interview is to maintain the participant’s attention at this level, 
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achieved through the guide’s sensitive, empathic and precise verbal and non-verbal 
encouragement. 
 
NLP proposes that inner experience consists of visual, auditory, kinaesthetic and 
olfactory/gustatory processes. It refers to these cognitive, sensory re-creations of 
experience as `internal representations’ (Grinder & Bandler 1976:6), a pre-verbal 
level of cognition where the senses were engaged in the subjective `re-presentation’ of 
experience, lived or imagined. Bandler and Grinder claimed that working with the 
way in which experience was constructed through such representations had a wide 
range of applications, from a means of curing people of phobias in psychotherapy 
(Bandler & Grinder 1979) to ways of enabling managers to develop effective 
strategies to achieve personal goals.  
 
While these claims about the efficacy of its applications are contested, the sensory 
nature of inner landscapes is increasingly borne out by developments in the cognitive 
and neuro- sciences (Barsalou 2008). Barsalou and colleagues claim that there is 
evidence that each reflective act engages the senses, though the person reflecting may 
be unaware of this. ‘Conceptual systems are multi-modal simulations distributed 
among modality specific systems’ (Barsalou 2003:513).  
 
NLP suggests that these sensory modalities can be broken down more finely as `sub-
modalities’ (Bandler & MacDonald 1988), and that people can become aware of such 
distinctions for themselves (see table 1). Re-lived or imagined events may reveal 
themselves in colours of different levels of brightness or clarity. They may be 
experienced as moving, have dimensionality, and an apparent location in space, as 
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well as a temporal duration. Such sub-modality distinctions can be accessed by a 
sensitive interviewer. It is important to note that the significance of variations in these 
distinctions needs to be established for each individual. Thus an increase in the 
brightness of an image (say) for person A may be associated with feeling happier; for 
person B it may be associated with feeling more exposed or vulnerable. 
 
For example, returning to the interview with Simon, when the interviewer asked for 
more detail about his responses in the visual domain he said: 
 
Simon: The colours, yeah, it’s gone more pastel. I mean I wasn’t aware of the colours 
before, but I would say now there must have been colours before because it’s become 
a very soft gentle picture which to me means more pastelly colours…. Softer lighting 
on the picture, it was a bright intense picture, but it’s very soft now, ehm, much more 
relaxing em, more pleasant, and more acceptable, the external auditory is a more 
acceptable part … becomes part of the picture. 
 
For Simon, therefore, there is a relationship between the colours becoming `more 
pastelly’ and feelings of `relaxing and more pleasant’. This may not hold true for 
another person.  
 
We note that information about sub-modality distinctions can be distinguished from 
more generalised description. Hence Simon’s description of the changes in a visual 
representation as ‘pastelly’, ‘soft’ and ‘slow’ is at a finer level of detail about his 
experience than ‘much more relaxing em, more pleasant, and more acceptable’.  
`Relaxing’, `pleasant’ and `acceptable’ are relatively vague terms which do not 
Deleted:  
Deleted: I
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describe an embodied experience in as much detail as the colours being ‘pastelly’. 
They describe his reactions to the experience, rather than the experience itself and are 
of a different order, in that they refer to the domains of beliefs and abstractions, rather 
than that of raw sensory description. 
 
The guide in the explicitation interview therefore needs to be knowledgeable about, 
for example, the ways in which verbal reports may vary in their levels of abstraction. 
Questions may be used to direct the participant’ attention to the elicitation of more 
specific information, which Vermersch (1994) describes as a more refined level of 
`granularity’. The guide may ask the interviewee to slow down a memory in order to 
notice even finer distinctions, or features of which they were not previously aware.  
Among further links to NLP, the researcher is also urged to attend to non-verbal signs 
that reveal, for example, whether a person’s attention is internal or external (usually,  
people look away and break eye contact when attending or searching internally). 
Vermersch also encourages guides to observe their respondents’ eye movements. In 
his view, observing and tracking eye movements provides valuable information which 
may indicate certain cognitive processes (Vermersch 1994:205). 
 
In summary, these extracts have shown examples of exploring syntactical structures 
(modal operators), internal representations (e.g. the picture) and sub-modalities (e.g. 
softness) as possibly new areas for phenomenological inquiry. Our earliest application 
of these ideas was as a means of analysing transcriptions to investigate a manager’s 
learning from an experience of organisational change (Tosey, Mathison, & Michelli 
2005). In order to do this we mapped the changing features of a manager’s `inner 
landscape’ as revealed by subtle syntactical changes in the transcripts over four time 
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intervals. NLP language models enabled us to identify changes in causal links, 
connections between conceptual entities, the extent to which the person experienced 
themselves as having choice and control in a situation, the qualities of perceptual 
space and time at different stages of the change, the sometimes unconscious scale of 
values that are referred to when judgements are made, and the changing metaphorical 
structures permeating this manager’s ways of thinking. 
 
Epoche 
 
The above sections have outlined the process of the explicitation interview. What of 
its outcome? 
 
One of us (Mathison) has investigated the methods of a gifted riding coach (M), who 
appeared to be using `guided introspection’ as a teaching method (Mathison & Tosey 
2008). The study was aimed at discovering more about the experience of 
transformative learning (Mezirow 1991), a field that we contend can benefit 
significantly from a capacity for detailed and precise description of events in people’s 
inner landscapes. In the study, Mathison became one of the coaches mounted students 
so as to be able to give a first person account of the experience of being coached, 
rather than just observing her lessons, which would have limited the research to a 
second person perspective.  
 
The following extract is taken from this investigation,  
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At one critical point in the lesson, I learn that I have a distortion in my upper 
body, which the coach points out to me. I make an attempt to correct the 
distortion. The coach comments: 
 
`M:  … OK, just keep really keeping the distortion that keeps you face left.  … 
What words do you think are going to most hold you in this place when you go 
to trot? 
My mind went blank; there was darkness, and for a split second there were no 
sounds or images, as if someone had dropped a shutter in front of my eyes. I do 
not know how long this suspension lasted. Then an image emerged as if from 
nowhere. I saw a yacht in full sail with its spinnaker bowed outward by the 
wind. There came a sense that my upper body needed to feel curved round like 
that spinnaker. 
  
Spinnaker I found myself telling her.’ 
 
(Mathison & Tosey 2008:82) 
 
What was so significant about this image for the rider? Using introspection, both at 
the time, and later, she realised that the image that had emerged had changed the way 
she held her upper body in the saddle.  
 
In retrospect this sequence was reminiscent of what Depraz et al (2003) have 
described as the stages in the phenomenological act of becoming aware. One of the 
aims of guided introspection is to enable inquirers to arrive at Epoche, which consists 
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of a cycle of three stages, the suspension of existing patterns of thinking, a redirection 
of attention towards interior processes so as to become more aware of the details and 
variety, and a ‘letting go’ (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:47), accompanied by 
the strangeness of unknowing - a conscious choice to be passive, to slow down so that 
insights can emerge and make themselves known.  
 
Epoche, a term derived from the Greek which originally had a number of meanings 
(Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:25), was used by Husserl to describe the process 
of actively suspending thinking and judging in order for new insights to emerge. In 
psychophenomenology, it is considered an essential part of inquiring into `the 
minimal and self-sufficient cycle of the reflective act’ (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 
2003:24). Epoche is completed through `an interruption of the flow of our 
unexamined thoughts and actions’ (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:254). It is a 
part of a never ending cycle of developing interior awareness and arriving at new 
insights.  
 
The final stages of the explicitation interview involve de-briefing, with checks to 
ensure that the guide has properly understood what has been communicated about the 
participant’s inner journey. There may be further sharing, reviewing and discussion of 
the findings with a group of collaborators. New insights and viewpoints may then 
emerge from such further sharing of information. 
 
In the explicitation interview the aim is to elicit descriptions at ever finer levels of 
detail, not to alter the interviewee’s experience. The interviewer therefore needs to be 
alert to the emergence of new qualities or features. This underlines the importance of 
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appropriate training or experience; as King acknowledges, a central aim of 
phenomenological interviewing is `for the researcher to consciously set aside his or 
her presuppositions about the phenomenon under investigation’ (2004:12-13). In 
psychophenomenology, the researcher needs to develop an awareness of how the 
syntactical structures of questions influence the responses that are elicited, so that 
they utilise language effectively whilst ensuring that they do not influence the 
responses inappropriately.  
 
Psychophenomenology and IPA: a brief comparison 
 
Compared with IPA (Smith 2008), psychophenomenology seeks to investigate 
conscious experience at ever finer levels of detail, and to put even the most fleeting 
mental events under a microscope, as it were, to find out more about how we make 
sense. A full exploration of the difference between psychophenomenology and IPA is 
beyond the scope of this article. Here we illustrate that difference using an extract 
from an interview people’s experiences of being a kidney dialysis patient (Smith 
2008:68), in which Smith explains how he interviews, then analyses the resulting 
transcript according to IPA guidelines. The extract is  
 
I dunno, that’s the pain bit, I know you’re going to say it’s all me, but I can’t 
help it, even though I don’t like it. It’s the mean me, my mean head all sour 
and horrible. I can’t cope with that bit. I cope with the pain better. 
 
The question then posed by the researcher using IPA was:  
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How do you cope with it? 
 
We would argue that as a result, this researcher was missing the opportunity to elicit a 
whole layer of the sufferer’s experience. To the psychophenomenologist, what is 
presented by this participant is a verbally expressed map of `the pain bit’, many 
further details of which could be accessed through the language used to describe it. 
Among the points of interest here, the word `sour’ is, in NLP terminology, a sensory 
predicate. This could alert the researcher to consider what could be happening at the 
sensory level of this person’s internal representation. They would want to know more 
about the detail of ‘sour’; is it being used metaphorically, or as a description of a 
bodily sensation? In order to explore this, they might begin by asking, ‘how do you 
know it is “sour”?’ Further detail of the dynamic role of `sour’ in this experience of 
`suffering’ could be explored through questions such as, `what makes it “sour” for 
you’?  
 
A second point of interest arises from the notion of `the mean me’. An NLP-trained 
interviewer might consider this from the point of view of process rather than content. 
For example, it is possible that there is an internal dialogue maintaining `the mean 
me’. If so, and if the words of the internal dialogue can be elicited, they might reveal 
conceptual linkages such as cause-effect structures and complex equivalences.   
 
There are many additional possibilities for exploration of the person’s 
phenomenological world based on this one utterance. The two examples given 
indicate that the utterance per se is (from the perspective of psychophenomology) at 
quite a broad, undetailed level. Yet in this example Smith moves directly to an 
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interpretation of this passage as: Attribution of unwanted self to the pain, and defence 
of original self (Smith 2008:69). For the psychophenomenologist, not only is there 
much more detail to be uncovered before any such conclusions are possible, but also, 
significantly,  the researcher has introduced his own inferences. Thus the notion of 
`unwanted’ is the researcher’s construct; the interviewee’s words (`don’t like’ and 
`can’t cope’) certainly do not necessarily mean that `the mean me’ is unwanted. By 
comparison with psychophenomenology, therefore, according to this example IPA 
appears over-interpretive and lacking in the capacity to make distinctions that are as 
fine-grained.  
 
Critical review 
 
In terms of traditions in phenomenology, psychophenomenology is clearly influenced 
by Husserl and as such is empirical rather than hermeneutic; the latter, according to 
Hein and Austin (2001), gives greater recognition to the social and cultural context of 
experience. Psychophenomenology would therefore need to address critiques of the 
transcendental approach to identifying essences of experience. Our experience and 
understanding of psychophenomology, however, is that it is concerned principally 
with eliciting detailed descriptions of experience and not with making transcendental 
claims about essences. There is, as in Petitimengin’s work, an interest in identifying 
common patterns across different individuals’ experiences. In its emphasis on 
embodiment, psychophenomenology also builds on the developments in 
phenomenology pursued by Merleau-Ponty (1962), although its direct influence in 
this respect is Varela (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1993).    
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Interestingly, Hein and Austin argue that there is little difference in output when 
comparing empirical and hermeneutic approaches. As indicated above by our 
comparison with IPA, we would expect psychophenomenology to show evidence of 
more finely detailed accounts of experience than could be developed through 
hermeneutic approaches.  
 
As a phenomenological approach to interviewing, it would be accurate to say that the 
explicitation interview is a `realist’ approach that assumes `that the accounts 
participants produce in interviews bear a direct relationship to their “real” experience’ 
(King 2004:12), in contrast, say, to the radical constructionist’s interest in the 
discursive strategies employed by the interviewee. The thrust of 
psychophenomenology is towards extending the detail of such accounts, at the same 
time as enhancing the interviewer’s capacity for `bracketing’. It therefore contributes 
to strategies for reflexivity on the part of the interviewer (King 2004:20). 
 
As noted earlier, psychophenomenology rejects linguistic determinism. It is wholly 
consistent with the commitment in phenomenology to discovering interviewees’ 
meanings and respecting their views of the world. The argument made by 
psychophenomenology is that it is knowledge of the forms and structures of language, 
not its contents, that enables the researcher to develop a more precise, extensive and 
rigorous understanding of the interviewee’s subjective world.  
 
The issue of whether the explicitation interview is accessing `true’ memories has been 
raised, usually (in our experience) by people working within the formal discipline of 
psychology. It is important to emphasise that psychophenomenology, like NLP, 
© Jane Mathison & Paul Tosey     October 2009, amended January 2010 
 
 
33 
regards all memories as constructions. Epistemologically, therefore, a distinction 
between `real’ and other memories is problematic. What is most important to 
emphasise is that psychophenomenology is not concerned with recall of external 
events, other than through identifying a past experience as a focus for exploration. 
The emphasis is instead on attending to internal processing. We would make no 
essential claim about the accuracy of such recall; the question is more of whether this 
approach yields accounts that are interesting and valuable because they are more 
detailed and less prone to inappropriate interpretation. We would suggest, however, 
that Petitmengin’s study of epileptics (Petitmengin, Baulac, & Navarro 2006), in 
which data from explicitation interviews were triangulated with fMRI scans, provides 
strong support for the validity of recall of internal processing through the explicitation 
interview.  
 
Finally there are issues of training, capacity to practise, and ownership. We infer from 
Vermersch’s view that many researchers conducting phenomenological interviews 
today are insufficiently trained, both in the structures and features of inner landscapes, 
and in the subtleties of language as used in interviews. According to Vermersch, they 
need the ability to use syntactical devices such as Ericksonian language patterns 
(Bandler & Grinder 1975b, Grinder, DeLozier, & Bandler 1977); to enable an 
interviewee to access the relevant levels of consciousness, and to become aware of 
features in their landscapes of which they had not hitherto been aware. One of 
Vermersch’s pre-conditions for the guide is to have had substantial experience of the 
processes of introspection themselves, and to be familiar with its various stages. `We 
insist that a truly phenomenological experience has to be trained and cultivated’ 
(Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch 2003:179). Without this, Vermersch insists that the 
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guide is not qualified to carry out the procedures. This raises issues such as the extent 
to which psychophenomenology is specialised and even elitist; of who owns 
knowledge and skills once they are in the public domain; and of who has the right to 
declare someone qualified.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Psychophenomenology represents a way of investigating experience methodically and 
to a greater level of detail than is apparent in other phenomenological methods used in 
organizational research. To our knowledge, the explicitation interview is distinctive in 
its emphasis on an understanding of syntactical structures and the qualities of internal 
representations. Significantly, it holds that an understanding of the complexities of 
language, in its epistemological dimension and in its practical effects, is as vital to this 
type of research as is statistics to quantitative methods.  
 
The ability to make such distinctions, and to target questions to elicit information 
about the lived, embodied, phenomenological aspects of subjective experience, is the 
hallmark of both NLP and psychophenomenology. Psychophenomenology would not 
have developed in its present form had it not been for the techniques and insights 
drawn from NLP that enable and enhance the extent to which people can offer 
rigorous descriptions of experience. We have described three central ways in which 
the explicitation interview incorporates NLP: 
 
 Enabling evocation through association, transderivational search and 
perceptual positions; 
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 The meta-model language patterns.   
 Eliciting sensory detail through internal sensory representations and their sub-
modalities; 
 
These techniques enable interviewers to formulate more precise and searching 
questions, which can be designed to target aspects of people’s cognitive and affective 
maps of experience, illustrating relationships between syntactical structures and 
people’s internal responses. They can also be applied to the analysis of transcripts, 
enabling researchers to identify changes in a respondent’s conceptual structures over 
time.  
 
We have argued that in psychophenomenology the researcher needs insights into the 
epistemological dimensions of different syntactical structures and levels of 
abstraction, and skills in the subtleties of questioning, directing, commanding, 
suggesting and giving permission to explore further. These are subtleties which may 
be lacking in more conventional approaches to phenomenological inquiry such as 
IPA. Psychophenomenology therefore represents an interesting attempt to bring 
greater rigour to the use of guided introspection to organizational research.  
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Table 1: Representational systems and associated sub-modality distinctions  
 
Representational 
system 
Visual Auditory Kinaesthetic Olfactory & 
Gustatory 
Submodalities 
(examples) 
Location  
Size  
Distance  
Brightness  
Focus 
Colour (or 
monochrome) 
Frame 
Motion 
Etc. 
Location 
Volume 
Pitch 
Tempo 
Rhythm 
Intensity 
Motion 
Etc. 
Location 
Temperature 
Pressure 
Intensity 
Scope 
Etc. 
Sweetness 
Sourness 
Saltiness 
Bitterness 
Etc. 
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Table 2: the NLP meta-model categories (page references from Bandler & Grinder 
1975a)  
 
DELETION 
 
 General case - where surface structure does not represent full deep structure; e.g. 
'My father was angry'. [challenge; 'how, specifically, was your father angry?'] 
 
Special Cases: 
 COMPARISON (deletion of one term of comparative construction); e.g. 'She is 
more interesting' [challenge; 'more interesting than...?'] Clearly and Obviously; 
adverbs used to make 'it is' or 'I am' statement (p. 66) 
 MODAL OPERATORS - must, should, etc. [challenge; 'who says we must?'; 
'what would happen if you didn't?'] (p. 69) 
 
DISTORTION 
 
 NOMINALISATION (process becomes an event); e.g. 'Our anxiety is stopping 
us' [challenge; clarify process that is equivalent to nominalisation 'anxiety'] (p. 74) 
 PRESUPPOSITIONS; e.g. 'I realise that my wife doesn't love me' (presupposes 
'my wife doesn't love me') [challenge; identify presupposition by negating 
sentence e.g. 'I don't realise..'; if a presupposition, the phrase must remain true 
for the sentence to make sense; draw attention] (p. 52; 92; also Appendix B 
p.210) 
 SEMANTIC ILL-FORMEDNESS: 
 CAUSE-EFFECT; e.g. 'My husband makes me mad' [challenge; 'how, 
specifically, does your husband make you mad?'] (p. 95) 
 MIND-READING; e.g. 'Everybody in the group thinks that I'm taking up too 
much time' [challenge; test] (p. 104) 
 LOST PERFORMATIVE (judgements stated as generalisations about the world); 
e.g. 'It's wrong to hurt anyone's feelings' [challenge; 'who says it's wrong?'; 'how 
do you know?'] (p. 106) 
 
GENERALISATION 
 
 REFERENTIAL INDICES (e.g. 'Nobody pays any attention to what I say') 
[challenge; 'nobody?'] (p. 80). 
 COMPLEX EQUIVALENCE (e.g. 'My husband never appreciates me...my 
husband never smiles at me'); [can try referential index shift (i.e. check for 
mirroring), 'Does your not smiling at your husband always mean that you don't 
appreciate him?'] (p. 88).  
 INCOMPLETELY SPECIFIED VERBS (e.g. 'My mother hurt me') (p. 90). 
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experience and data obtained simultaneously from fMRI scanners. 
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iv Psychophenomenology is not the only method available for this type of exploration. 
Another contemporary practice that intentionally explores the imagery of inner 
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detailed protocol of `clean language’, typically used in coaching or psychotherapy, 
also appears highly applicable to phenomenological research. 
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